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Abstract (submitted version only) 15 
This paper aims to add new empirical and theoretical insights to the debate on climate change 16 
adaptation and regional and urban studies by linking the analysis of UK climate adaptation 17 
policy to the city-regionalist political processes and state structures. We argue, firstly, that 18 
UK climate adaptation policy has not adjusted to the rise of city-regionalism, and accordingly 19 
underplays the role of sub-national political interests and agendas in demarcating specific 20 
sectors and scales of adaptation. Secondly, climate adaptation policy has not only been slow 21 
to adjust to the rising significance of city-regionalism but also raises strategic policy 22 
questions about the longer-term trajectory of climate change adaptation in light of the 23 
territorial logic of the national competition state which currently frames effective adaptation 24 
planning, action and policy at subnational political scales. The paper argues that future 25 
research on climate adaptation governance needs to address the uneasy relationship between 26 
the rise of city-regionalism, on the one hand, and the sector-led priorities of the competition 27 
state, on the other.    28 
 29 
Introduction 30 
 This paper aims to add new empirical and theoretical insights to the debate on climate 31 
change adaptation and regional and urban studies by linking the analysis of UK climate 32 
adaptation policy to the city-regionalist political processes and state structures. We argue, 33 
firstly, that UK climate adaptation policy has not adjusted to the rise of city-regionalism, and 34 
accordingly underplays the role of sub-national political interests and agendas in demarcating 35 
specific sectors and scales of adaptation. Secondly, climate adaptation policy has not only been 36 
slow to adjust to the rising significance of city-regionalism but also raises strategic policy 37 
questions about the longer-term trajectory of climate change adaptation in light of the territorial 38 
logic of the national competition state which currently frames effective adaptation planning, 39 
action and policy at subnational political scales. 40 
 41 
 Drawing upon a study of UK adaptation policy and governance, this article challenges 42 
current orthodoxy that uncritically locates effective climate adaptation exclusively within 43 
national economic sectors but ignores subnational political interests, processes and state 44 
structures especially those coalescing around city-regionalist agendas. Although climate 45 
adaptation policy is rapidly being adopted by many nations (Massey, Biesbroek, Huitema, & 46 
Jordan, 2014), the UK state has arguably been ahead of the curve on climate adaptation policy 47 
since the 2008 Climate Change Act (Biesbroek et al., 2010). Nonetheless, UK climate 48 
adaptation policy has hitherto been delivered at the national scale through the UK National 49 
Adaptation Programme (England) (DEFRA, 2013), the Adaptation Delivery Plan: Climate 50 
Change Strategy for Wales (2010), Sector Action Plans (Scotland) (2009), Scottish Climate 51 
Change Adaptation Programme (2013), and more recently the UK Climate Change Risk 52 
Assessment Evidence Report (Committee on Climate Change, 2017b). Whilst this positioning 53 
corresponds with the internationalisation agenda of the UK ‘competition state’, defined here as 54 
the state moving away from a welfare orientation by promoting increased marketisation 55 
through the liberalisation of cross-border trade and capital flows, re-commodifying labour, and 56 
privatizing public services (Genschel & Seelkopf, 2015), it fails to acknowledge other politico-57 
spatial pressures that contribute to the devolved and politically fragmented character of climate 58 
adaptation governance, including the rise of city-regionalism as a discrete space of state 59 
policymaking and the re-assertion of ‘national’ political agendas in climate change adaptation 60 
governance across UK regions. Based upon evidence from the UK, it is suggested that 61 
adaptation is being sub-nationally reconstituted within a one-size fits all international 62 
competition state framework that fails to recognise how effective adaptation action needs to be 63 
move beyond dominant competitiveness discourses and engage with a range of local public, 64 
private and third sector stakeholders especially those engaged in city-regional processes.  65 
 66 
 We are cognizant that adaptation research in other countries, particularly in the Global 67 
South, have shown how different mapping techniques for adaptation and resilience planning at 68 
the city scale are heterogeneous, producing diverse understandings of resilience (Borie et al., 69 
2019). Likewise, in the global North climate policy is increasingly led by regions and cities 70 
rather than national government, especially in the United States where the federal government 71 
is no longer committed to recent international climate agreements. However, the UK climate 72 
policy experience has tended to be more state-led, with national policy often dictating what 73 
local authorities (e.g. city councils) should be doing. The UK developmental context is 74 
certainly different from countries and cities of the Global South, yet regardless of 75 
developmental contexts, if countries need to formally legislate for climate change adaptation 76 
all need to be more cognizant of respective place-based attributes and experiences to ensure 77 
climate adaptation policy is locally fit-for-purpose and takes into account the co-production 78 
roles of different urban and regional stakeholders  (Howarth, Morse-Jones, Brooks, & 79 
Kythreotis, 2018). 80 
 81 
Drawing upon findings of research conducted in three UK devolved regions (England, 82 
Scotland and Wales) between 2014 and 2017, this paper identifies three distinct processes 83 
shaping the strategic position of climate adaptation policy in the UK: (1) sector-driven 84 
territorial logic of the national competition state; (2) emergence of city-regionalism as an 85 
adaptation governance response to increased competition; and (3) the distinctive role that 86 
‘national’ political priorities play in implementing climate adaptation across regions. The 87 
empirical research involved 28 interviews with national and subnational climate adaptation 88 
governance and policy stakeholders in: Cardiff (Wales); Glasgow (Scotland); and the 89 
Yorkshire and Humber sub-region (comprising Leeds, York and Hull) (England). These city-90 
regions were selected to capture (a) the increasing importance of the city-region scale in 91 
national and subnational territorial policymaking in the UK (and hence also more widely) and 92 
(b) differences in how devolved national administrations within each region have dealt with 93 
the challenges of climate adaptation. The interviews reveal how climate adaptation policy has 94 
been slow to adjust to the rising significance of city-regionalism and national political interests 95 
in demarcating specific sectors and scales of adaptation planning in the devolved regions. At a 96 
practical level, the single-minded pursuit of ‘sectoral adaptation’ as a central plank of state 97 
competitiveness agendas hinders the communication of adaptation best-practice between 98 
policymakers and communities across different subnational jurisdictional policy spaces. This 99 
contradicts much of the adaptation planning literature which argues developing long-term 100 
adaptive capacity should be primarily through state rescaling and polycentric governance (e.g. 101 
Adger, Arnell, & Tompkins, 2005; Amundsen, Berglund, & Westskog, 2010; Juhola & 102 
Westerhoff, 2011; Kythreotis & Bristow, 2017; Waters & Barnett, 2018). Despite recent 103 
attempts to align sectors and borders in climate risk research (Challinor et al., 2018), there 104 
remains significant differences in how these are epistemologically constituted. So, their 105 
conflation can be analytically dangerous given that sectors and borders frame specific types of 106 
adaptation response. Hence, we argue that future research and evidence that informs climate 107 
adaptation policy should pay greater attention to the role of territorial politics and governance 108 
in shaping how sector-based strategies are implemented in different national and subnational 109 
(regional and urban) contexts. 110 
  111 
Section two briefly discusses the significance of climate adaptation in the UK since the 112 
accession of the 2008 Climate Change Act, with reference both to how the devolved regions 113 
address climate adaptation and to the emergence of city-regions as new spaces of the state 114 
charged with drawing together local authority climate action measures. Section three discusses 115 
how the spatial reconfiguration of climate adaptation in the UK has been influenced by the 116 
sectoral and territorial imperatives of the competition state in the UK. Section four utilises the 117 
interview data to illustrate how this spatial reconfiguration is shaped by discourses of 118 
international competitiveness, city-regionalism and changing subnational political priorities. 119 
We conclude by suggesting that future research on climate adaptation governance more 120 
generally, must address the uneasy relationship between the potential rise of city-regionalism 121 
as a distinct characteristic of the competition state, on one hand, and the sector-led priorities of 122 
the competition state, on the other.    123 
 124 
2. Climate adaptation policy and the spatial reconfiguration of the state  125 
 Climate adaptation has evolved into an important climate policy imperative at 126 
international, national and, increasingly, subnational scales (e.g. Adger et al., 2005). Much has 127 
been written about the complexities of implementing state-led climate adaptation policy in the 128 
context of economic globalisation (e.g. Eakin & Lemos, 2006) and the various systemic 129 
competition pressures that are put on national states through the global neoliberal project that 130 
commodifies natural capital (Clark & York, 2005; Fieldman, 2011). The emergence of 131 
resilience as a central policy discourse that justifies this continued global neoliberal paradigm 132 
has been well documented (e.g. Welsh, 2014), and more recent work has attempted to highlight 133 
the importance of resilience in uniting different social, political and economic priorities in 134 
managing urban climate adaptation responses sub-nationally in the UK (Kythreotis, 2018; 135 
Kythreotis & Bristow, 2017).  136 
 137 
 Whilst we are cognisant that higher scale international pressures inevitably encroach 138 
upon the abilities of national and local states to implement more effective adaptation responses, 139 
there is a need to investigate specific examples of how national states have dealt with 140 
‘downscale’ adaptation policy pressures that materialise sub-nationally. Governments in many 141 
countries accept that there will be a need to adjust to the impacts of current warming trends and 142 
that impacts will increase in magnitude and severity over the coming years (IPCC, 2014). 143 
Moreover, national climate adaptation strategies (as compared to mitigation strategies) have 144 
been viewed as constitutive of successfully tackling climate change (Berrang-Ford, Ford, & 145 
Paterson, 2011), arguably as a result of failed global mitigation efforts (Bassett & Fogelman, 146 
2013).  147 
 148 
 National climate adaptation policy in more developed countries is part of a wider 149 
process of ‘eco-state restructuring’ whereby national states, including the UK, have responded 150 
to growing international environmental legislation by selectively establishing new institutional 151 
and governance structures for managing economy-environment tensions at national and 152 
subnational scales (While, Jonas, & Gibbs, 2010). However, in contrast to the forms of eco-153 
state restructuring experienced in low carbon mitigation projects, climate adaptation 154 
governance across the UK opens up the possibility of challenging the ‘top down’ territorial 155 
logic underlying environmental policymaking in the competition state by exposing emerging 156 
national spaces of climate adaptation to subnational pressures of democratic accountability. 157 
This could be viewed as a positive step given the attributes of successful climate adaptation 158 
being based upon more locally and place-specific forms of cultural, social and political 159 
sensibilities (Adger, Barnett, Brown, Marshall, & O’Brien, 2013; Measham et al., 2011; Vogel 160 
& Henstra, 2015). However, any devolved governance agendas are still subjugated by the 161 
sectoral approach that overarches UK state adaptation policy (Hjerpe, Storbjörk, & Alberth, 162 
2015).  163 
 164 
Sub-national climate adaptation responsibility has been highly structured and 165 
orchestrated at the UK national policy scale (Coaffee, 2013). Policy has principally evolved 166 
out of the 2008 Climate Change Act, which established national strategies on climate 167 
mitigation and adaptation. The Act set out a procedure for Climate Change Risk Assessments 168 
(CCRA) every five years (two CCRAs so far in 2012 and 2017) and led to the creation of a 169 
new independent advisory body, the UK Committee on Climate Change (UKCCC), which 170 
established an Adaptation Sub-Committee (ASC) to provide expert advice and scrutiny on 171 
adaptation. The Act also gave the UK Government an Adaptation Reporting Power (ARP) to 172 
direct other organisations (‘Reporting Authorities’) to report on current and future impacts of 173 
climate change on such organisations and outline proposals for adaptation. 174 
  175 
The evidence-base of climate risks through the first CCRA in 2012 led to the statutory 176 
implementation of the UK National Adaptation Programme (NAP) in 2013, principally devised 177 
for England, with the devolved regions having to implement their own adaptation programmes: 178 
Scottish Adaptation Programme (2013), Welsh Sectoral Adaptation Plans (built on the Wales 179 
Climate Strategy 2010) and a cross departmental Northern Ireland Adaptation Programme 180 
(2013). Locally-led adaptation action through increased state and non-state governance are 181 
highly important (DEFRA, 2013), whereby the Local Adaptation Advisory Panel (LAAP) and 182 
the network ‘Climate UK’ provided links between central and local governments. Yet whilst 183 
such programmes enabled respective local authorities to work with other public and non-public 184 
stakeholders in local adaptation planning, it is not statutory for all UK local authorities to report 185 
on adaptation actions; stakeholder organisations involved in the first CCRA did so on a 186 
voluntary basis. This confirms critiques of such adaptation programmes for their lack of co-187 
ordination, stakeholder involvement and unclear divisions of responsibilities (Biesbroek et al., 188 
2010).  189 
 190 
The 2012 UK Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA) assessed sectoral risks of 191 
climate impacts to the UK up to the year 2100, involving consultation with over 500 192 
stakeholders from eleven different sectors (DEFRA, 2012: 17-18). This was to be used to 193 
inform future adaptation planning in the devolved regions, although both Scotland and Wales 194 
had already produced specific adaptation plans for various sectors because of their own 195 
respective devolved government’s environmental assessments and public consultations. The 196 
Climate Change Act of 2008 also enabled government ministers to direct certain bodies to 197 
prepare reports on adaptation. The sectoral approach to adaptation was taken up by all the 198 
devolved regions in some form, although each approach was allied through a risk-based 199 
sectoral approach to managing climate adaptation across the UK state (Figure 1). The shaded 200 
area illustrates the most important sectors as defined through each devolved sectoral plan. 201 
Northern Ireland is included for devolved sectoral comparison purposes but was not part of the 202 
research. Getting cross-sectional responses was important because England, Scotland and 203 
Wales have approached adaptation policy in different ways because devolution has given each 204 
country certain policy autonomies, despite being statutorily bounded by the Climate Change 205 
Act (2008). This overarching legislation required a UK policy framework for national risk 206 
assessments every five years, a UK Committee on Climate Change (which comprises an 207 
adaptation sub-committee), the National Adaptation Programme (NAP) and the UK Adaptation 208 
Reporting Power (Committee on Climate Change, 2017a).  209 
 210 
What is important for examining the sectoral focus of each devolved region, though 211 
bounded by the UK Climate Act, also enabled the researchers to ascertain how seriously 212 
adaptation is taken by each devolved nation. For example, the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 213 
of 2009 requires all public bodies (including local authorities) in Scotland to report on 214 
adaptation if required by Scottish Ministers. Additionally, Scottish  Government funded 215 
‘Adaptation Scotland’ through its own adaptation programme (The Scottish Government, 216 
2013) which introduced an array of different adaptation and resilience community-based 217 
project initiatives. At the time of the research, Wales was already disbanding the Climate 218 
Commission for Wales, which had a specific adaptation sub-board to monitor Welsh 219 
Government progress on sectoral adaptation plans and were replacing this with other legally-220 
binding legislation via the 2015 Well-being of Future Generations Act (Future Generations 221 
Commissioner for Wales, 2019) which set up seven long-term well-being goals that included 222 
a ‘Resilient Wales’. Additionally, the 2016 Wales Environment Act (Legislation.Gov.UK, 223 
2016) attempted to legally marry up Welsh carbon emissions targets with UK 2050 emission 224 
targets (e.g. was mitigation focussed), although this Act did not really introduce anything 225 
specific related to climate adaptation policy in Wales. England’s adaptation policy progress 226 
had been rather stunted at the national scale although the Local Adaptation Advisory Panel 227 
(LAAP) was designed to promote adaptation in local councils and draw other non-state 228 
governance actors into promoting bespoke local adaptation initiatives across England. 229 
However, local council adaptation plans in England has been found to be wanting in certain 230 
sectors like transport (Walker, Adger, & Russel, 2015). Hence, interviewing different 231 
governance actors in each devolved region of England, Scotland and Wales might reveal 232 
something more nuanced about devolved sectoral policy attention to climate adaptation across 233 
the UK, as well as telling us how such devolved adaptation plans were strategically aligning 234 
sub-national jurisdictional spaces, particularly city-regions, with upscale devolved and UK 235 
adaptation policies. 236 
 237 
INSERT TABLE HERE 238 
 239 
Table 1 shows firstly the devolved regions’ sectoral focus included in respective 240 
adaptation strategies which could be seen to act as proxies for how seriously each devolved 241 
region was committed towards climate adaptation. Secondly, the timings in how each devolved 242 
administration were focusing on developing sectoral adaptation plans is significant. Scotland 243 
appeared more progressive than other devolved regions in formalising adaptation plans for 244 
certain sectors in tandem with the 2009 Climate Change Act (Scotland), Scotland’s statutory 245 
response to tackling climate change. In comparison to other countries, it is important to note 246 
that other devolved UK regions, like England, also developed climate adaptation as a distinct 247 
policy strategy through substantive authority (e.g. a legal framework), institutional order (e.g. 248 
ministerial responsibilities and mechanisms) and substantive expertise (policy documents and 249 
a cross-cutting governance structure that involves state and non-state actors) (Massey & 250 
Huitema, 2012). In this sense, the UK state could be normatively seen as an international leader 251 
in climate adaptation policy  (Massey et al., 2014; Tangney & Howes, 2016), but there were 252 
(are) important differences within the UK state that distinguish each devolved regions’ urgency 253 
and attention towards promoting a governance and policy agenda for climate adaptation. 254 
Indeed, the current 2017 CCRA reflects the urgency of climate adaptation assessment by 255 
bestowing a range of urgency scores (confidence levels) for environmental risks across 256 
different sectoral areas that encompass natural environments and natural assets (Committee on 257 
Climate Change, 2017b, p. 9). 258 
 259 
Therefore, the UK approach regarding adaptation since the 2008 Climate Change Act 260 
is becoming more normatively attuned to both devolved regions and local needs and risks with 261 
respect to adaptation. However, whilst there are policy examples and institutional support 262 
mechanisms of ‘joined-up’ governance between national and subnational jurisdictions, like the 263 
LAAP and Climate UK, much of the evidence-base of risks regarding adaptation have been 264 
developed through the CCRA that took a sectoral approach to analysing climate risks. Hence, 265 
we argue that, on one hand, the UK state programme of adaptation has rescaled adaptation as 266 
an extra-territorial governance project across all the devolved regions. Yet on the other hand, 267 
the way in which sectoral risks have become a cornerstone of the very same UK state policy 268 
on adaptation points to a more nuanced tension in the territorial governance logics of climate 269 
adaptation in the UK today; one that positions the UK central state as maintaining ultimate 270 
control over how adaptation is discursively framed as a subnational political governance 271 
project. Hence, climate risk assessments are inevitably constrained by underlying normative 272 
values and goals that can constrain successful adaptation response (Adger, Brown, & 273 
Surminski, 2018). Such values and goals will inevitably be exacerbated and influenced by the 274 
Brexit process as the UK government moves to transpose European Union (EU) environmental 275 
legislation into UK law through the Great Repeal Bill. Early indications at the time of writing 276 
suggest that climate-related legislation and subsequent planning may suffer (Cowell, 2017; 277 
Hepburn & Teytelboym, 2017) and climate targets previously driven through EU membership 278 
may be under-prioritised as the UK seeks to cement new free trade agreements around the 279 
world (Rayner & Jordan, 2016; Scott, 2016). At the UK national level, DEFRAs launch of the 280 
2017 CCRA Evidence Report was given little publicity by DEFRA in comparison to the 2012 281 
CCRA Evidence Report, and the 2017 CCRA was significantly under-resourced compared to 282 
the 2012 CCRA (Howarth et al., under review). The 2017 CCRA is based upon economic 283 
urgency and the effects of adaptation and socio-economic change on risk, whereas the 2012 284 
CCRA did not include the effects of planned adaptation or socio-economic effects beyond 285 
population control (Humphrey, 2015). These recent UK climate policy horizons show how the 286 
governance of climate adaptation will undergo significant spatial reconfigurations as the UK 287 
state attempts to discursively frame, strategically-steer and align future climate adaptation 288 
policy with more pressing extra-economic priorities through adopting a sectoral risk-based 289 
approach. 290 
 291 
3 Climate change adaptation and the rise of city-regionalism 292 
Whilst there has been growing academic interest in describing and explaining the scalar 293 
politics of climate change governance (see Bulkeley, 2005), the emergence of city-regionalism 294 
as a ‘new state space’ (Brenner, 2004) with potential responsibility for climate adaptation 295 
remains under-researched.1 Whilst we recognise that effective urban adaptation policy and 296 
practice is highly contingent on the ‘activity space’ of the particular country in question 297 
                                                          
1 This situation is not helped by efforts to  ‘flatten’ scale as an ontological construct (Marston, 
Jones, & Woodward, 2005), which in turn encourage a mistaken view that (sub-national) 
territorial politics are causally insignificant if not downright antediluvian features in the 
landscape of state spatial reconfiguration (Jonas, 2012; Morgan, 2007). 
(Pelling, O’Brien, & Matyas, 2015), hitherto research on city-regionalism has prioritised 298 
analysis of a possible causal relationship between the rise of competitive forms of city-regional 299 
governance and administration, on the one hand, and the internationalisation of the competition 300 
state, on the other (e.g. Jonas, 2013; Wachsmuth, 2017). However recent work suggests that 301 
the rise of city-regionalism as a domestic policy agenda further reflects how the state has sought 302 
to reconfigure territory in response to a host of pressing national political problems and tensions 303 
linked with globalisation, climate change and security (Harrison, 2010; Jonas & Moisio, 2018). 304 
For example, city response to climate change can benefit from a range of performance 305 
management criteria to better allocate resources and make more accountable streamlined 306 
decisions regarding climate change strategies (Jones, 2018). So, although climate change is 307 
increasingly recognised and framed as a source of ongoing tensions in the competition state, 308 
little has been written on its role in shaping contemporary territorial politics of city-regionalism 309 
within an economically developed national context where overarching statutory legislation is 310 
highly developed (e.g. UK at large) yet can be politically (re)constituted and (re)framed 311 
through certain institutionalised devolved powers of regions (e.g. Scotland, Wales, Northern 312 
Ireland).  313 
 314 
There is growing evidence that city-regionalism is not solely framed by discourses of 315 
international competitiveness but also a variety of other social, political and environmental 316 
agendas, including sustainable development (Krueger & Gibbs, 2010). As cities around the 317 
world plan for both climate mitigation and adaptation (Bulkeley, 2013), city-regionalism is 318 
associated with new forms of collective action around social and environmental provision. Yet 319 
at the same time city-regions have ‘omnipresent institutional legacies’ (see Peck, 2016) that 320 
either enable or disable their ability to promote climate adaptation. For example, climate 321 
adaptation is being framed as a governance discourse across the devolved regions of the UK 322 
through the emergence of a more economically-centric resilience agenda for climate change 323 
policy and planning sub-nationally in the UK (Howarth & Brooks, 2017; Kythreotis & Bristow, 324 
2017). The focus on sectoral risks in the CCRA for each devolved region could illustrate the 325 
emergence of a UK state-wide adaptation policy agenda governed by competition state 326 
territorial logics (that economically manage adaptation responses in the short-term), rather than 327 
adaptation being seen as a subjective socio-political and cultural process that requires more 328 
transformative, long-term anticipatory pathways of policy response (Adger et al., 2013; 329 
Eriksen, Nightingale, & Eakin, 2015; Kythreotis & Bristow, 2017).  330 
 331 
 As is the case for other aspects of urban and regional governance, climate-related 332 
policies and capacities increasingly draw on social relations and political structures extending 333 
well beyond the jurisdictional limits of the city-region, which in turn bring national and 334 
international economic and political priorities into the analytical frame of the region (Allen & 335 
Cochrane, 2007; Kythreotis, 2018; Prytherch, 2010).  Climate governance in the UK has been 336 
shaped by more than forty years of international and national environmental regulation, the 337 
scale, scope and reach of which has broadened and deepened over time in response to rapidly-338 
changing global and national political circumstances (While et al., 2010). Until recently, 339 
climate change initiatives in the UK were developed mainly as a response to measures 340 
undertaken at international and European Union (EU) levels. These include the 1997 Kyoto 341 
Protocol, the EU’s 2008 effort to allocate territorially-based greenhouse gas emissions (GHGE) 342 
reduction targets to its member states and the 2015 Paris Agreement. Under the EU’s 2008 343 
effort sharing decision the UK was allocated a target of 14% CO2 emission reduction by 2020 344 
(Wurzel, Connelly, & Liefferink, 2016). Although the UK government has since ratified the 345 
2015 Paris Agreement, the outcome of UK’s EU membership referendum in favour of leaving 346 
the EU has thrown into doubt Britain’s continued commitment to EU climate policies (Rayner 347 
& Jordan, 2016). Some argued that UK commitments under the Paris Agreement are unlikely 348 
to change after Brexit, and whether its carbon reduction commitments will remain joint with 349 
the EU or as a single party remains uncertain (Scott, 2016), but there are calls for the UK to 350 
include a target for achieving ‘net-zero’ emissions target in its Climate Change Act 351 
(Fankhauser, Averchenkova, & Finnegan, 2018). The UK government has recently announced 352 
plans to be carbon emission neutral by 2050 (Harrabin, 2019), but this inevitably requires 353 
bottom-up action (e.g. increased citizen pro-environmental behaviour) in addition to more 354 
strengthened policy action from  government. 355 
 356 
Simultaneously, UK climate change policy has always emphasized a strong national 357 
and regional orientation, particularly around GHGE (mitigation) targets as they are directly 358 
linked to wider economic policies that emphasise the importance of subnational contributions 359 
to a national low carbon economy agenda. The two main strategies of climate policy (mitigation 360 
and adaptation) are fragmented: whilst intrinsically related through practical implementation 361 
and management of risks and vulnerabilities at regional and urban scales (Laukkonen et al., 362 
2009), mitigation has been the main focal point of international and national state policies on 363 
climate change because of the need to lower GHGE (Klein, Schipper, & Dessai, 2005). This 364 
wider territorial climate policy logic of prioritising lowering emissions first has trickled down 365 
to subnational climate policy agendas, (see Bulkeley, Broto, & Edwards, 2012), resulting in 366 
UK local government treating adaptation in an ad-hoc limited fashion because there lacks 367 
political and institutional support from central government. (Porter, Demeritt, & Dessai, 2015) 368 
 369 
In summary, whilst climate adaptation is developing as subnational territorial 370 
governance in the UK,  an adaptation agenda has been overtly top-down in policy focus (Adger 371 
et al., 2018), with little evidence of coherent responses to adaptation as a long-term issue within 372 
the devolved regions (e.g. Flynn, Kythreotis, & Netherwood, 2016) and at local authority/city-373 
regional levels (Kythreotis & Bristow, 2017; Porter et al., 2015). Whereas in developed 374 
countries climate actions are coalescing at municipal or subnational scales (Ford, Berrang-375 
Ford, & Paterson, 2011), in the UK such actions are matched and framed within state 376 
competition logics through alignment with different economic sectors (see Table 1) since the 377 
UK 2008 Climate Change Act. The 2012 and 2017 CCRAs show continued evidence of 378 
adaptation being viewed solely in terms of the risks and opportunities that can emerge out of 379 
the physical climatic impacts that are, and will be, experienced across the UK up to 2100 380 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2017b). This is also reflected in the language of policymakers, 381 
which points to subnational political discourse regarding climate adaptation being spatially 382 
reconfigured within blanket neoliberal resilience thinking to incorporate the private sector 383 
within such urban territorial logics (Kythreotis & Bristow, 2017; Romsdahl, Kirilenko, Wood, 384 
& Hultquist, 2017), where in fact there needs to be greater individual citizen engagement with 385 
both the science and policy domains in order to meet top-down international emission and 386 
temperature targets (Kythreotis et al., 2019)This sub-national adaptation policy ‘deficit’ will 387 
only be exacerbated by the UK leaving the EU as international legislation protects UK 388 
mitigation, but not adaptation commitments (Farstad, Carter, & Burns, 2018). This only creates 389 
a clearer pathway for future sub-national adaptation policy responses to be framed within the 390 
bias of national economic sectors that perpetuate the competition state, as the next section 391 
illustrates. 392 
 393 
4. Climate adaptation and reconfiguring the UK state 394 
The remainder of the paper reports the findings of empirical research conducted in three 395 
UK regions (England, Scotland and Wales) between 2015 and 2017. Our analysis is organised 396 
around three quite distinctive, yet at the same time potentially conflictual, processes shaping 397 
the strategic position of climate adaptation policy in the UK state: (1) the sector-driven 398 
territorial logic of the national competition state; (2) the emergence of city-regionalism as an 399 
adaptation governance response to increased competition; and (3) the distinctive role that 400 
‘national’ political priorities play in the implementation of climate adaptation across the UK 401 
regions. The findings are based on interviews conducted with 28 national and subnational 402 
climate adaption governance and policy stakeholders in Cardiff city-region (Wales), Glasgow 403 
city-region (Scotland), and the Yorkshire and Humber sub-region (comprising Leeds, York and 404 
Hull city-regions) (England). 405 
 406 
4.1 Sectoral climate adaptation and state competitiveness 407 
Although not explicitly referred to in these terms in the interviews, the territorial logic 408 
underpinning the competition state emerged as an important issue amongst adaptation 409 
governance and policymaking stakeholders working across different state jurisdictional scales 410 
in the UK. One interviewee who worked at the local authority level and on the Local Adaptation 411 
Advisory Panel (LAAP), pointed out tensions between emerging UK state discourses of 412 
competitiveness (and austerity) and how this was affecting and shaping UK climate adaptation 413 
policy: 414 
 415 
[W]e want to have a prosperous economy… affordable houses… people with the 416 
 right skills and training…jobs availability, we want inward investment.  We want to 417 
 increase exports.  And I think there is a very clear impact on business if they ignore 418 
 adaptation measures.  It will ultimately impact on their bottom line whether that is 419 
 because their premises are flooded, the infrastructure network is flooded, and they 420 
 can't get stuff moving...  I think we need to do a little bit more to help businesses  421 
understand that by taking resilience and adaptation seriously it can have an impact 422 
 on their bottom line. 423 
 424 
 Climate adaptation is treated by the UK state and major financial sectors as a normative 425 
economic policy issue that has not progressed into firmer social and political action at the 426 
subnational scale – climate adaptation is framed by a discourse of international 427 
competitiveness, which in turn chimes with the low carbon city agenda approach by the UK 428 
state. Indeed, other work has highlighted how, in spite of the UK Climate Change Act, climate 429 
policy has not gained complete political traction and investor confidence because of the 430 
immediate costs to the state in having to react to uncertain risks and there has not been clear 431 
evidence of climate policy reform which need to involve changing (subnational) governance 432 
structures and alter existing economic monopolies if to initiate deeper structural political 433 
change (Lockwood, 2013).  434 
 435 
Although the city-region has unlimited potential as an urban fix for such governance 436 
working (Carter et al., 2015; Kythreotis & Bristow, 2017), the UK state gives priority to climate 437 
mitigation over climate adaptation within this climate agenda, as the outcomes are intrinsically 438 
related to a more competitive UK state approach: 439 
   440 
[T]here’s still very much a focus particularly in tough economic times on mitigation 441 
because you can see that you’re going to save money on mitigation.  You know it’s a 442 
no brainer.  You’re going to reduce your emissions.  ...  But other things for adaptation 443 
it’s difficult to quantify what you’re going to say because it  might not be saving 444 
money. 445 
 446 
The overriding attention to mitigation in subnational climate policy discourse is 447 
reflected in how local adaptation is approached by the UK state and the devolved regions. One 448 
environmental consultant in Wales pointed out how Welsh Government, through the Climate 449 
Change Commission of Wales, was pursuing an agenda for adaptation that focused specifically 450 
on sectoral opportunities that aligned with wider UK state economic policy agendas, rather 451 
than viewing adaptation as a more spatially discursive political governance construct: 452 
 453 
[T]hat is down to the Climate Change Commission as well.  They're putting all their 454 
bags into this sectoral action plan thing because it fits well with government.  It fits the 455 
shape of the organisation… So tackling stuff by sector, if you take  agriculture, who 456 
are the key factors there on agriculture?  NFU, FUW, some of the big agricultural 457 
companies, some of the bigger landowners might take some notice, sectoral action plan 458 
on the shelf, yes that's very interesting... 459 
 460 
This shows how the drive towards widened subnational adaptation governance has to 461 
contend with a variety of state infrastructural and managerial interferences, which have the 462 
power to subvert how adaptation tackles urban and regional vulnerability (Bassett & Fogelman, 463 
2013; Eriksen et al., 2015). 464 
 465 
4.2 Climate adaptation and city-regionalism 466 
Nonetheless, city-regionalism is not exclusively driven by competitiveness at the 467 
expense of issues of social provision (Halbert & Rouanet, 2014; Jonas & Ward, 2007). This 468 
sub-section demonstrates how UK climate adaptation policymakers have encountered a range 469 
of ongoing infrastructural and collective provision challenges as climate policy has come to 470 
ground in UK city-regions. These challenges include issues related to housing, energy, fiscal 471 
distribution, planning and the allocation of land uses. For example, one interviewee working 472 
for Natural Resources Wales highlighted how housing and transport issues in the Cardiff city-473 
region needed to directly address future climate change: 474 
 475 
I[f] you look at this issue of housing targets… or air debate about, well where are 476 
 45,000 houses going to be built in Cardiff… if you just look at the city meeting 477 
 arbitrary targets, then you may not arrive at what is essentially the best solution in 478 
 terms of a sustainable or best climate change adapted solution… I’d like to see far 479 
 more explicit recognition in the city region at that scale of planning for housing, 480 
 transport. 481 
In a similar vein, a local council officer from Cardiff highlighted the importance of city 482 
regionalism to wider environmental and climate policy agenda, “[I]n particular, looking at 483 
things like public transport and waste is being considered at the city region level when you 484 
look at project worth and how they’re coming together on that.  Maybe the local authorities 485 
need to be even bigger…” This comment was interesting in that the forms of adaptation 486 
governance and policy recommended for the city-region actually originate and are influenced 487 
by stakeholders beyond the proximity of that specific urban area (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005), to 488 
meet the burgeoning economic priorities of UK city-regions. For example, in Greater 489 
Manchester, urban political leaders embed strategic adaptation governance measures within 490 
urban spatial planning and policy frameworks by involving different stakeholders above and 491 
beyond councillors in Manchester Town Hall in strategies to reduce citizen vulnerability to 492 
climate impacts. They simultaneously indirectly meet infrastructural and collective provision 493 
challenges like housing development and greater access to sustainable transport (Carter et al., 494 
2015). The Greater Manchester city-regional partnership have recognised the importance of 495 
shifting from blanket sectoral adaptation plans that do not take account of the 496 
physical/topographical, cultural, economic and political diversities of the surrounding city-497 
region to deal with a variety of climatic impacts, especially flooding (Carter et al., 2015). 498 
The issue of using sectoral adaptation plans in dealing with various infrastructural 499 
challenges was also raised by another climate consultant interviewee working in the Cardiff 500 
city-region: 501 
 502 
[T]ake it down to a local level [where], you get a clear kind of idea of the impacts 503 
 given the topography, the nature of the rural economy, the number of farms, where 504 
 they are, where they are related to the water catchments, what the transport 505 
 infrastructure is like.  You get a far more detailed and resonant picture… thinking a 506 
 bit more long-term in our business planning, to adapt… [W]hat I am trying to 507 
 illustrate is you can get into the detail of adaptation with a locally proximate picture.  508 
 Whereas a sectoral action plan, what's that going to achieve?  It might nudge 509 
 government departments which is essential.  But we shouldn’t be putting all of our 510 
 eggs in a sectoral action plan basket. 511 
 512 
This demonstrates that whilst strategically using the city-region to muster adaptation 513 
governance support and build widened capacity is an important political tactic, there remains 514 
a paradoxical need to practically address local adaptation challenges to prevent maladaptation. 515 
This highlights a tension between city-region adaptation being considered by policymakers as 516 
a strategic economic tool versus the practical action of adaptation implementation to reduce 517 
citizen vulnerability. North et al. (2017) highlighted in the context of urban austerity the 518 
conflict between effective climate (mitigation) policy implementation and green growth 519 
strategies in the post-industrial city of Liverpool. They argue that co-production governance 520 
can challenge the pre-existing neoliberal consensus of green growth as a framework for 521 
implementing and justifying effective climate policy. Future adaptation policy in the UK 522 
therefore will continue to be governed by a trade-off between strategy and practical action with 523 
respect to climate adaptation. 524 
 525 
Other interviewees in the Glasgow city-region swiftly pointed out how a new City Deal, 526 
like that in Manchester, could attend to this tension by solving infrastructural economic 527 
challenges that take account of future climate impacts: 528 
 529 
[C]ritical infrastructure doesn’t begin and end with the boundaries of the city or 530 
 local government.  We also link to the recently announced ‘city deal’, which is the 531 
 first one in Scotland… similar to the ones in Manchester and elsewhere… it is an 532 
 infrastructural development … it is often about economic development, roads, rails 533 
 and so on, we are also looking at an infrastructure that protects, preserves and 534 
 adapts  other forms what is aging and crumbling infrastructure, so key walls along the 535 
 river, we would also like to issue a green infrastructure that is a key part of that.  536 
  537 
Another interviewee from Glasgow city-region supported the idea of City Deals 538 
(agreement between central government and a city to enable the city to take greater 539 
responsibility of local decisions regarding economic growth and public spending) that 540 
encompass the city-region to embed adaptation into infrastructural provision: 541 
 542 
 In terms of adaptation action and the governance of it and the relevance of city 543 
 regions because of those economic realities of the city region, I would have said yes, 544 
 it [a city deal] makes most sense and because of the interaction between things like 545 
 catchment, river catchments and cities, you know the boundary of the city isn’t the 546 
 relevant place to stop or to start your kind of governance arrangements or your 547 
 decision-making processes. 548 
 549 
Our findings illustrate how future infrastructural challenges of UK cities will play a 550 
significant role in how adaptation policy is embedded within city-regions. Importantly, it shows 551 
how planning adaptation through sectoral-based approaches may not be successful given that 552 
effective adaptation action and reducing urban and regional vulnerability relies on a need for 553 
policymakers to embrace the idea that city-regions are socially diverse geographical spaces 554 
where a ‘one-size fits all’ national adaptation policy framework does not work. Measuring 555 
adaptation responses in a more comparable conceptual way has is difficult given the 556 
heterogeneity of how different jurisdictional territories respond to climate impacts (Dupuis & 557 
Biesbroek, 2013). Nonetheless, city-regions have adopted different climate leadership 558 
strategies to deal with infrastructural and collective provision challenges, especially in 559 
traditionally structurally disadvantaged cities, but remain dependent on higher political scales 560 
to ensure that such leadership can be resourced and supported (Wurzel et al., n.d.). Hence, we 561 
find that adaptation governance in UK city-regions rely heavily on polycentric systems of 562 
policy and governance to ensure that specific city-regional economic and environmental 563 
challenges are met.  564 
  565 
4.3 Climate adaptation and the national question 566 
 Our interviews also highlighted the emergent importance of subnational priorities, 567 
which are increasingly articulated in relation to UK climate adaptation policy. For example, 568 
one interviewee from Natural Resources Wales argued how national priorities at the UK level 569 
regarding climate change has enabled the Welsh Government to designate other subnational 570 
actors more power in shaping local and regional adaptation policy responses: 571 
 572 
[T]he Climate Change Act 2008… gave the Welsh Government a power to issue 573 
guidance to bodies in Wales on how to adapt to climate change… to designate certain 574 
key organisations as reporting authorities, and then to direct them to produce a report 575 
showing how they were adapting to climate change. 576 
 577 
In Scotland, a more developed relationship between national and subnational 578 
stakeholders was in evidence because of national legislation, as mentioned by a Glasgow City 579 
Council climate officer: 580 
 581 
Scottish Government sit on sustainable Glasgow, ahead of climate change… so [we 582 
are] very closely linked to them and whatever political aspects within Scotland, why is 583 
lay administration and the Scottish Government, we get on well with the civil service 584 
on a practical basis, particularly what works in Glasgow works for Scotland… In terms 585 
of other partners, we have got a lot of public sector partners. I mentioned to you it 586 
includes the NHS, Strathclyde partnership with transport, a public sector planning 587 
organisation, public transport. Universities and so on. 588 
 589 
Our interviews found evidence of the devolved regions making links with subnational 590 
adaptation stakeholders where non-state groups were integral to this new adaptation 591 
governance emanating out of national legislation. However, the types of governance promoted 592 
tends to coalesce around the idea of sectors as forming the major response to climate 593 
adaptation: “The sectoral adaptation plans are part of Welsh Government’s wider adaptation 594 
strategy for bringing action across the five sectors in those plans.” However, he goes on to 595 
explain how some major issues remain the remit of national adaptation policy: 596 
 597 
In terms of the reserved issues then… DEFRAs National Adaptation Programme would 598 
pick up things like major infrastructure, but that’s really more or less [of] it. In terms 599 
of most everything else, then it’s down to Welsh Government to draw up its own 600 
adaptation programme. 601 
 602 
This caveat illustrates how transitions from national to subnational independence on 603 
determining the types of adaptation policy responses that are locally implemented remain 604 
influenced by national policy priorities that ‘sectoralise’ adaptation responses. This has come 605 
under scrutiny from third-sector groups working on environmental issues who felt adaptation 606 
was more about the spaces in which people lived rather than sectors. As one climate officer 607 
from a third sector organisation working across Wales argued: 608 
  609 
People don’t really know where to start to think about it [climate adaptation].  We did 610 
some work with the third sector partnership council… that involved talking to third 611 
sector organisations and saying what do you need? … [B]ut they just really didn’t know 612 
what’s the next step...  So we’ve come to a bit of a block there on it … there is interest 613 
but people need signposting and they need some specialist guidance on what to do, 614 
because people aren’t experts in these fields and it’s such a potentially significant field 615 
people think well I can’t just take advice from anyone, it has to be somebody that we 616 
respect and we trust. 617 
 618 
Ad-hoc subnational adaptation policy responses were also suggested by another climate 619 
consultant working with several Welsh local authorities on local climate adaptation issues: 620 
 621 
Well the question is, is it going to influence action on the ground?  If we have a climate, 622 
well we do have a Climate Change Act.  We have an adaptation plan which that's a 623 
national framework.  And we have local authorities there just bumbling along doing 624 
what they've always done.  Where’s the connect?  The connect is in the guideline, the 625 
missive, the remit, kind of carrots and sticks to push local authorities to think about this 626 
more.  And when they think about it more and start developing that local narrative you 627 
can get to practical stuff very, very quickly rather than motional, sectoral and 628 
abstract… 629 
 630 
So, whilst national adaptation policy has given subnational stakeholders the policy tools 631 
to actually implement a form of subnational adaptation governance, this largely depends on 632 
local authority will to invoke policy change. Changes to national policy priorities considering 633 
Brexit will inevitably have an influence on the way adaptation is positioned and rolled out 634 
across the devolved UK regions. The fact that major infrastructure decisions in the context of 635 
adaptation remain in the hands of the NAP, and therefore, this sectoral approach, illustrates an 636 
ongoing national-subnational governance tension. As the same climate consultant continued: 637 
 638 
Well the regional is action as well because you have key actors in adaptation working 639 
at regional level.  So that's definitely about action.  I think developing at a regional 640 
picture is very, very important.  I’ll give you an example.  We were doing some work in 641 
Powys.  It was around futures.  But involved climate adaptation.  We had maps out.  642 
And people were there from Ceredigion… and all of a sudden the penny dropped.  How 643 
reliant Ceredigion was on Powys getting its climate adaptation right because of 644 
transport networks.  So I think there is a role particularly around infrastructure which 645 
is regional and catchment which is regional.  So in a sense the local and regional should 646 
be about narrative, capturing the risks and opportunities and working on those shared 647 
risks and opportunities.  But you can't kind of put a fudge in this uniform kind of frame 648 
on Wales and say there's five regions where climate adaptation should work.” 649 
 650 
Overall, the ‘national’ question in respect of climate adaptation is a focus of ongoing tension, 651 




6. Conclusions 656 
This paper has examined how climate adaptation governance fits within the UK state 657 
during a period of profound political tensions and uncertainties which are changing the balance 658 
of power between the national UK state, the regions and their constituent city-regions. The 659 
question of whether and in what form a discrete ‘national’ policy on climate adaptation exists 660 
is rendered increasingly problematic by recent devolutionary trends and the rise of city-661 
regionalist agendas. Considering this, the UK currently offers a unique and timely platform to 662 
examine the emerging urban and regional policy horizons with respect to climate adaptation. 663 
However, we argue that further research progress on climate governance is hampered by a 664 
failure to recognise the rise of city-regionalism as a distinct and causally significant new space 665 
of politics and policymaking inside the state.  666 
 667 
Drawing upon the findings of interviews with climate adaptation stakeholders, the 668 
paper has provided new insights into the way regions have responded to climate adaptation by 669 
incorporating it into sub-national political priorities. Many interviewees paint a positive picture 670 
of how emergent national adaptation priorities have catalysed a more inclusive governance 671 
project sub-nationally. However, deeper analysis of interviews reveals interlinked nuanced 672 
points regarding sectoral governance of adaptation across regions. In concluding, we highlight 673 
two themes that warrant further theoretically-informed empirical research. 674 
 675 
Firstly, we find that current studies of climate adaptation policy are not sufficiently 676 
equipped to recognise the rise of city-regionalism and therefore underplay the role of sub-677 
national political interests and agendas in demarcating specific sectors and scales of adaptation 678 
planning across regions. The pursuit of ‘sectoral adaptation’ as a central plank of state 679 
competitiveness agendas obscures the subtle ways in which adaptation best practice is 680 
communicated between policymakers and communities across different sub-national political 681 
jurisdictions and policy spaces. Consequently, research on national climate adaptation policy 682 
often fails to acknowledge the role of territorial politics in shaping how sector-based strategies 683 
are implemented in different national and subnational (regional and urban) contexts. On the 684 
one hand, this sectoral approach enables the state to reign over devolved and subnational 685 
governance adaptation responses and has been influenced by discourses of international 686 
competitiveness, city-regionalism and changing subnational political priorities. On the other 687 
hand, city-regionalism has opened up a strategic space for other material interests and 688 
rationalities to shape climate adaptation policy from below. Since city-regions are inherently 689 
socially diverse spaces where interests in collective social provision often override those 690 
relating to economic growth and competition, there is further scope for climate adaptation 691 
policy to deviate significantly from the national norm.  692 
 693 
Secondly, and focussing more directly on the UK context, climate adaptation policy has 694 
not only been slow to adjust to the rising significance of city-regionalism but also raises 695 
strategic policy questions about the longer-term trajectory of change as the UK prepares to exit 696 
the EU. Notably, there are serious questions raised about the future role of climate governance 697 
in the devolved regions of Scotland and Wales and their relation to the rest of the UK as the 698 
terms of EU exit are negotiated. Will regions want to renegotiate existing climate agreements 699 
with UK government? How will national and sub-national climate adaptation policy feed into 700 
other policy debates such as future trade agreements with the EU and non-EU partners? How 701 
does climate adaptation policy influence the internationalisation of the UK competition state 702 
in the medium to long term? Similar questions could likewise inform future research on climate 703 
adaptation governance across different national settings and, in so doing, shed further light on 704 
the complex and evolving relationships between the rise of city-regionalism, on the one hand, 705 
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